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In the traditional model of ﬁ  nancial intermediation, the sources and the process of liquidity creation through 
banks’ balance sheets were particularly clear. The robustness of liquidity in such a regime is essentially 
based on the quality of the banks’ assets and the credibility offered by the institutional framework within 
which they operate (deposit insurance, access to central bank money and more generally regulatory and 
prudential constraints).
In the current ﬁ  nancial system, with the perpetual supply of new capital and risk transfer instruments, 
endogenous liquidity sources have undeniably diversiﬁ  ed and grown, but they appear to be less stable 
and reliable. Financial innovation, to an extent, may have let market participants believe that they could, on 
an enduring basis, escape from the monetary constraint (the need for genuine cash) and that they could 
make do with the liabilities issued by other institutions to meet their liquidity needs.
However, market instruments can satisfy investors’ liquidity preference only as long as the state of 
conﬁ  dence in the marketplace supports them. Liquidity preference, which is intimately linked to asset price 
expectations, is indeed liable to shift swiftly at times, and to bring about runs on the most certain forms of 
liquidity (bank money, and worse, central bank money). Ultimately, the liquidity of ﬁ  nancial assets depends 
on the trust that they can be redeemed on demand.
Such trust is probably more difﬁ  cult to ascertain in the market-based, highly securitised world.
Still, crises may sometimes have educational virtues, and the turmoil of this summer has revealed some 
urgent needs to “robustify” the sources of liquidity in the system. It is now obvious that some additional 
suppliers of liquidity are needed in nearly absent secondary markets for complex structured credit products. 
This probably cannot be achieved without greater disclosure on the structures of investments among 
market participants. It is also clear that the containment of liquidity risk depends on the ability of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to properly price complex products, in their regular risk management process as well as in 
times of crisis.
The “liquidity frontier” cannot be pushed back indeﬁ  nitely. Those who, in the end, accept illiquidity in their 
balance sheet must clearly understand and control the risks they are taking on. Such illiquidity is more 
acceptable for investors with long time horizons, and who are not subject to creditors suddenly calling in 
their money at short notice. For others, larger liquidity buffers acting as an automatic stabiliser to smooth 
the ﬁ  nancial cycle might be necessary to hedge their risk.
Without such precautions, ﬁ  nancial innovation could unduly extend the liquidity insurance implicitly expected 
of central banks. Yet, it is certainly not the role of a central bank to prompt market participants to rush into 
“not-so-reliable liabilities”.ARTICLES
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O
ver the last few years, investors have felt 
increasingly comfortable with risk seeking, 
due in part to the view that proﬁ  table, but 
illiquid investments, could easily be disposed of in the 
markets, thanks to a plentiful supply of money, low 
interest rates and the inﬂ  ows of cash from developing 
and oil-exporting countries running surpluses with 
the US. Furthermore, the conviction that ﬁ  nancial 
engineering would always allow risks to be ofﬂ  oaded 
to hundreds of other market participants has made 
this search for yield all the more attractive.
The current ﬁ  nancial turmoil has at the very least 
shaken this common notion of “abundant liquidity” 
in world ﬁ  nancial markets. It has shown that market 
liquidity can never be taken for granted, even in usually 
placid markets. This summer, not only were markets 
for securitized mortgages hit, but the core of interbank 
relationships have been endangered, prompting several 
central banks to provide substantial amounts of cash, at 
times in emergency liquidity assistance operations.
This episode of liquidity drain invites us to consider 
the structural changes that have affected the ﬁ  nancial 
sector in recent decades and that have deeply 
changed the way liquidity is provided to the system. 
Throughout the post-Bretton Woods period, the world 
ﬁ  nancial system has beneﬁ  ted from a continuous 
expansion of the availability and variety of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments. New forms of intermediation and new 
ﬁ  nancial products –especially those meant for the 
transfer of credit risk– have added ﬂ  exibility to 
ﬁ  nancial transactions and can be seen as a response 
to the demand for more liquid balance-sheets. Like in 
the past, this process of ﬁ  nancial development and 
innovation has been a way to push back illiquidity 
constraints.1 It has resulted in the creation of new 
sources of endogenous liquidity in markets, and 
simultaneously, moved banks away from their 
traditional monetary role, i.e. providing liquidity by 
making loans and taking deposits. Key in this process, 
securitization has enabled economic agents to obtain 
cash more readily against an array of future expected 
cash ﬂ  ows: from basic assets (loans, securities and 
receivables) as well as other securitized products such 
as subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) or asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP).
This structural change towards more completeness 
in ﬁ  nancial markets, raises the question of the 
robustness of this liquidity provision regime: are 
the new sources of liquidity sufﬁ  ciently reliable? Is it 
possible to circumvent the monetary constraint on a 
long-term basis, i.e. continually produce substitutes 
for money through innovation without risking 
recurrent and distressing returns to the ultimate 
form of liquidity (central bank money)?
We will ﬁ  rst attempt to clarify the way the “liquidity 
frontier” has been pushed back in the current 
ﬁ  nancial system, which will reveal the conditions 
for liquidity creation. We will then examine to what 
extent such a regime may been moving closer to the 
limits of illiquidity.
1| A  NEW LIQUIDITY PROVISION 
  REGIME: PUSHING BACK 
  THE LIQUIDITY FRONTIER
In an ideal world of “complete markets”, every 
commodity is perfectly liquid and therefore liquidity 
is always available when it is needed. Liquidity 
provision would not be an issue in such a world. In 
incomplete (real) markets, having access to liquidity 
implies either trading in a market or bank contracts 
(deposit contracts or credit lines) that offer an option 
to withdraw when liquidity is needed.
Bank-based systems have naturally produced liquidity 
in the latter form essentially, through monetary 
intermediation. The evolution towards more 
market-based ﬁ  nancial relationships does not mean, 
however, that ﬁ  nancial intermediation has become 
less useful in the process of liquidity creation. On 
the contrary, competition in the ﬁ  nancial sector has 
spurred the growth of non-bank institutions offering 
new products adapted to the liquidity preference of 
investors. The increased size of the ﬁ  nancial market 
has even coincided with a shift away from direct 
participation by individuals in ﬁ  nancial markets 
towards participation through various kinds of 
intermediaries such as investment or pension funds.2 
1  J.R. Hicks (1969) shows, for example, how the Second Industrial Revolution has been mainly a Financial Revolution, with the growth of capital markets, which 
made possible the ﬁ  nancing of large-scale and highly illiquid investments such as railroad infrastructures.
2  See Allen and Santomero (1999).ARTICLES
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The current ﬁ  nancial system would therefore be 
better characterised as an “intermediated-market 
based system”.
In fact, ﬁ  nancial intermediaries have always produced 
liquidity either by means of trading in markets or 
by asset transformation. What has fundamentally 
changed is not these functions but their relative 
proportion and their forms.
1|1   Liquidity provision through 
traditional bank intermediation
In less diversiﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial systems, liquidity is 
essentially a product of banking activity through 
deposit-taking and loan supply. Such traditional 
monetary intermediation provides insight into the 
necessary conditions for liquidity to be created: the 
ability of banks to make their debt continuously 
acceptable (i.e.  their ability to roll over their 
deposit-taking) in order to fund their loan supply 
(notably in the form of loan commitments).3 The 
acceptability of demand deposits as money in turn 
rests on various characteristics of banks, notably 
the level of their capital, the quality of their assets 
and the institutional framework within which they 
operate (prudential supervision, deposit insurance, 
access to central bank money, etc.).
Conﬁ  dence in the quality of the debt issued by banks is 
thus key to the continuity of liquidity production. This 
is the essential foundation for liquidity to exist.
The theory of ﬁ  nancial intermediation suggests that 
the liquidity insurance offered by banks stems from 
their ability to transform assets. This transformation 
activity exists because banks are supposed to be better 
at pooling, selecting and monitoring investments than 
their depositors. In fact, any intermediary (whether 
bank or non bank) produces liquidity as long as it 
performs “qualitative asset transformation”.4 This is 
a conclusion that can be drawn from the seminal 
work of Gurley and Shaw (1960), which remains 
particularly relevant in the analysis of the activity of 
the non-monetary ﬁ  nancial intermediaries that have 
grown in the last twenty years (mutual funds, pension 
funds, hedge funds, etc.). According to Gurley and 
Shaw, the function of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries is to 
hold “primary debt securities” issued by economic 
agents with funding needs, and to collect resources 
among agents with surplus funds (investors) by 
issuing “indirect debt securities” that better meet their 
preferences than primary securities, notably in terms 
of liquidity. This function highlights the core business 
of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries: customization of ﬁ  nancial 
products, risk management and ﬁ  nancial innovation. 
By absorbing some risks, reducing asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers as well 
as transaction costs, ﬁ  nancial intermediaries are 
thus in a position to offer more liquid and acceptable 
assets to investors. Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue 
that the “fragile capital structure” of banks, subject 
to runs by depositors, is paradoxically a condition 
of their activity of liquidity creation. Without their 
typical balance sheet mismatch, they would simply 
mimic the market and would not add liquidity to 
the ﬁ  nancial system. Thus, it is from their ability to 
absorb risks (counterparty risk, duration risk, market 
risk, etc.) and manage them credibly that their ability 
to create liquidity stems.
In recent decades, deregulation and increased 
competition in the financial sector have given 
impetus to a rapid movement of innovation. As a 
consequence, banks have been enticed to move to 
the “originate to distribute” model, by which they 
originate loans and then distribute the underlying 
risk to a myriad of outside investors by means of 
dedicated, innovative instruments. Banks have also 
purchased more willingly assets with the sole intention 
of reselling them. This new form of business model 
has deeply changed the modes of risk absorption in 
the ﬁ  nancial system, and hence, has given rise to new 
forms of liquidity creation: less through monetary 
ﬁ  nancing and more via capital market operations.
1|2   Capital markets as a growing 
source of endogenous liquidity
One of the fundamental consequences of the 
competition between banks and capital markets, 
as highlighted by Allen and Gale (1997), has been a 
change in the risk management function of banks. 
Traditionally, banks perform an “intertemporal 
3  As shown by Kashyap, Rajan, Stein (2002), there is a natural synergy between these two activities, as long as deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are 
not perfectly correlated.
4  This expression, attributable to Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), refers to the transformation of maturity, unit amount and other characteristics of assets performed 
by ﬁ  nancial intermediaries.ARTICLES
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smoothing” function to stabilize returns and insure 
investors against risks that cannot be diversiﬁ  ed at a 
given point in time. This involves building up  reserves 
of liquid and safe assets in good times, on which banks 
can draw to shield their customers from the liquidity 
shocks to which they may be subject over time.
This capacity to absorb risk on an intertemporal 
basis has precisely been at the base of liquidity 
production by banks. But with increasing competition 
from markets in the collection of resources, and 
the emergence of more attractive market products 
for investors, banks have found it more difﬁ  cult to 
manage risks (and consequently produce liquidity) 
that way: this is precisely reﬂ  ected in the change
in the composition of banks’ balance sheets in 
developed countries over the long run, with the decline 
in cash holdings and traditional liquid assets.
Instead, banks have increasingly used derivatives 
and similar techniques for managing risks. These 
market-based techniques are well adapted to 
“cross sectional risk sharing” (i.e. achieved through 
exchanges of risks among investors at a given point in 
time). Hence the development of credit risk transfer 
activities in the markets, based on credit derivatives 
and asset securitization. This development has led 
to the “commoditization” of credit risk. Financial 
innovation has enabled risks to be sliced and diced, 
and traded on their own or rebundled in the form of 
new products. This greater ability to trade risks and 
assets through market transactions in itself enhances 
the liquidity of the ﬁ  nancial system. New ﬁ  nancial 
structures engaged in maturity transformation, and 
acting more or less like banks have also emerged 
(money market mutual funds, securitization vehicles, 
etc.), which contributes to liquidity production, 
at least in normal times, as long as there is some 
maturity mismatch in their balance sheet and that 
this situation is sustainable.
In the process, banks have reduced their holding 
of non-tradable claims and increasingly behaved 
like non-bank ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. Banks still 
provide liquidity in this way, but they are also more 
dependent on the market for ensuring their own 
liquidity, which constitutes a major change.
By putting greater demands on capital markets, 
banks (and other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries) basically 
rely on other investors’ ability and willingness to 
step in to provide cash exactly when needed. 
Both  models of liquidity provision (through 
traditional, relationship-based intermediation 
and through arm’s-length, market-based ﬁ  nance) 
certainly rest on conﬁ  dence. But the ﬁ  rst regime 
is more institutionalized: the source of liquidity 
is in this case clearly identified: i.e. banks’ 
balance sheets. Conversely, the new regime 
has diluted the sources of liquidity. They stem 
from multilateral, anonymous relationships in 
the marketplace, which makes them even more 
conﬁ  dence-sensitive and probably more fragile.
2| ON THE BORDERS OF ILLIQUIDITY
The marketisation of liquidity goes hand in hand with 
the proliferation of innovative bespoke instruments 
that lack deep, “battle-tested” secondary markets. By 
nature, their lack of transparency for investors is an 
impediment to the maturation of such secondary 
markets and even, sometimes, to the existence of 
an observable market price. Moreover, by feeding 
leverage, financial engineering increases the 
probability of market illiquidity and, at the same time, 
gives investors a misleading sense of liquidity.
2|1   Informational failures 
at the core of liquidity risk
LIQUIDITY AS A COGNITIVE PROBLEM
For an asset to become easily negotiable, it has to be 
turned into a common item for trade, i.e. standardized 
somewhat. The more an asset has a transparent 
economic value, whose features can be credibly 
communicated to a large investor base, the greater 
its potential liquidity. Indeed, standardisation 
reduces the need to make costly investment to get 
detailed information, and reinforces the certainty 
of the nominal value attached to any liquid asset. 
As some sociologists nicely put it, liquidity is also 
“a problem of public knowledge about economic 
assets”,5 and relies on people’s ability to formalize 
the income streams and events that affect the value 
of these assets.
5 See  Carruthers  et al. (1999) who ascribe the “liquidiﬁ  cation” of the US secondary mortgage market to the process of homogenization organized by government 
agencies (Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac) through the setting of formal standards and uniform protocols for underwriting mortgage transactions.ARTICLES
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Many institutional arrangements can improve the 
understanding of assets, thus making them more 
acceptable: certifications, credit enhancements 
(such as those provided by monoline insurers), the 
fungibility technique6 or agency ratings for instance. 
The creation and development of organised exchanges 
for derivatives is clearly one of those innovations 
that simpliﬁ  ed the trading process for many goods, 
by setting a common informational environment 
for traders. Obviously, it is easier to standardise the 
contractual terms of derivatives than the physical 
underlying commodity to be delivered. This accounts, 
for example, for the ﬂ  uidiﬁ  cation and growth of energy 
markets in the recent years. In the same vein, ISDA 
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association) 
master agreements have boosted the development 
and liquidity of credit default swaps (CDS) markets.
The basic process of securitisation also corresponds 
to this logic, when it is based on homogenous claims. 
It then allows the creation of information on the pool 
of underlying assets and diminishes the informational 
requirements for investors. Securitisation contributes 
to mitigate informational problems. The pooling 
of homogenous assets is a way to reduce adverse 
selection problems for investors (the probability 
of selecting low-performing assets), since the 
performance of a pool is more predictable than the 
performance of individual assets. This, in principle, 
helps investors to discriminate between sellers of good 
and bad products. In addition, tranching the proceeds 
stemming from the pool of assets according to their 
risk of default mitigates moral hazard problems (the 
probability that the seller will not monitor the risks 
carefully after their securitisation), when the seller 
commits to bear the ﬁ  rst losses.
COGNITIVE FAILURES 
IN THE SECURITISED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Nevertheless, for a large part, the creation of securities 
collateralised by assets has not been accompanied 
by the information needed by market participants 
to fully control their investments. The substantial 
information costs in structured ﬁ  nance is a factor that 
should limit the investor base. As centralised sources 
of information, rating agencies may in principle 
alleviate this cognitive burden, and indeed in recent 
years some less sophisticated investors have bought 
structured products by relying on  ratings. But rating 
agencies could not eliminate  completely information 
gaps. This is particularly true for market liquidity risk, 
which is difﬁ  cult to summarise in a simple rating.
First and foremost, the piling up of securitisation layers 
that largely characterises complex products markets, 
tends to conceal the amount of commitments and 
embedded leverage in the marketplace. This results 
in considerable valuation difﬁ  culties, especially for 
products that are very infrequently traded and that 
lack comparability with similar assets. In normal 
circumstances –or if these products are part of a 
“buy and hold” strategy– this feature is innocuous for 
market liquidity. But it can turn to a serious threat 
when urgent demands on liquidity crop up, and when 
they prompt forced selling.
The difﬁ  culty or inability to assess the true value of 
assets for some structured products is in itself a major 
cause of the propagation of liquidity crises. This 
creates all the conditions of a “market for lemons”. 
In general terms, a substantial ﬂ  ow of sell orders for 
an asset is likely to arouse the suspicion that initiators 
of transactions have privileged information on the 
quality of this asset, and lead potential buyers to 
demand an important price discount in exchange. In 
such a “market for lemons”, the drop in the price may 
even lead to the total disappearance of the market, 
as demonstrated by Akerlof (1970) in a founding 
theoretical paper, and as illustrated, notably, in the 
US ABCP market this summer, where people became 
suddenly reluctant to buy such securities. It appears 
that the more customised the products are, the more 
they are prone to such bouts of distrust on the part 
of investors.
This is precisely why a liquidity crisis originating from 
complex structured products markets manifests itself as 
a “ﬂ  ight to simplicity”, beneﬁ  ting US Treasury bills for 
instance. This ﬂ  ight to the most understandable assets 
can have detrimental effects even for markets that in 
principle had no reason to be affected but were not fully 
transparent. For example, AAA tranches –in principle 
the safest– of collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) 
suffered from a drying-up of issuance simply because 
they were part of the assets of ABCP conduits and 
SIVs,7 the most critical structures in the crisis. It is 
likely that, from now on, those investors that have 
6  By which new government bonds, for example French OATs, are issued with exactly the same properties as those of earlier lines.
7  Structured investment vehicles are special purpose structured ﬁ  nance operating companies, off-balance sheet, that fund a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of highly rated assets 
by issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), medium-term notes and capital. Their aim is to generate a spread between the yield of the portfolio and the 
vehicle’s cost of funding, by managing credit and liquidity risk.ARTICLES
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permanent liquidity needs (asset managers and 
bank-related funds) will decide to turn to simple or 
highly standardised forms of securitised instruments 
(securities backed by pools of homogenous assets). 
Other investors, able to hold assets to maturity (life 
insurers, pension funds, etc.) are normally in a better 
position to invest in illiquid structured products like 
CDOs or CLOs since they are more interested in the 
revenue ﬂ  ows generated by these assets than by their 
market value at a point in time.
All in all, the securitised ﬁ  nancial system is particularly 
prone, in some non-standard and opaque segments, to 
crises of valuation and conﬁ  dence. Hence the risk of a 
sudden loss of conﬁ  dence and market making, and the 
disruption of liquidity in the underlying markets.
2|2   Risk dispersion 
and systemic illiquidity
Conﬁ  dence and liquidity are not only threatened by 
the limitations of information processing capabilities 
of investors, but also by the deﬁ  ciencies in the control 
of risks created by issuers and originators in a highly 
securitised world. In fact, it is questionable whether 
greater ability to spread risks necessarily leads to a 
more resilient ﬁ  nancial system. Better risk dispersion 
does not mean that risks disappear altogether. It 
can even be argued that they may increase on an 
aggregate level.
A MINSKIAN READING OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
AND LIQUIDITY
As early as the 1950s, Hyman Minsky developed the 
argument that ﬁ  nancial innovation could lead to a rise 
in systemic illiquidity. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that regards the growth of markets for tradable 
instruments as reducing the risk of liquidity crises, 
Minsky (1986) considers that every innovation that 
leads both to new ways to ﬁ  nance business and new 
substitutes for cash assets in fact implies a growing 
exposure to illiquidity risk on an aggregate level. 
This is because the value of ﬁ  nancial instruments 
relative to the quantity of means of payment cannot 
rise indeﬁ  nitely without jeopardising the ability to 
redeem the debts incurred. Indeed, an increase in 
leverage in the system makes it more vulnerable to a 
sudden re-appraisal of risks and abrupt shifts in the 
liquidity demand from investors, including banks. 
An unexpected rise in the liquidity preference, like 
the one that occurred in the interbank market this 
summer, is always a threat to the ﬂ  uid and normal 
circulation of liquidity in the markets.8
This fragility is concealed in periods of euphoria, 
when it seems painless to fund illiquid long-term 
assets with short-term, presumably liquid liabilities, 
i.e. when the distinction between near-moneys and 
money proper fades away. Then, the “transformation 
risk” is overlooked. But it comes to the forefront 
again when distress erupts. As distress cascades 
through the system, liquidity providers turn into 
liquidity demanders. The scope of leverage has been 
considerably increased with ﬁ  nancial engineering:9 
this appears as a threat to the robustness of liquidity.
The ability to dispose of risks may have generated 
bad incentives, and fuelled excess risk-taking by the 
banking sector through less monitoring and screening 
of borrowers and increased leverage. Securitisation 
indeed creates an agency problem between the 
originator and the ultimate holder. In order to maximise 
fees, the originator has an incentive to maximise the 
volume of structured products from loans and is, to 
some extent, less motivated to care about the quality 
of loans that are not meant to remain on its balance 
sheet. Some evidence has been found that banks using 
the loans sales market for risk management purposes 
hold less capital and make more risky loans than other 
banks.10 Not only do banks not necessarily take fewer 
risks with the use of credit risk transfer instruments, 
but they have also created additional (potential) 
risks in the system through innovation, when selling 
non-standard risks to the market or through the use of 
highly leveraged structures, with short-term ﬁ  nancing, 
that increase the likelihood and the potential market 
impact of a distressed liquidation.
8  Hence, liquidity is not primarily a question of aggregate quantities. It is fundamentally lodged in the preferences and constraints of economic agents. 
9  For example, constant proportion debt obligations (CPDO) vehicles –one of the newest creations in credit markets– borrow up to 15 times their capital to insure an 
index of bonds (such as the iTraxx) against default.
10  See Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004). Hänsel and Krahnen (2007) also document that the issue of CDOs tends to raise the systematic risk of the issuing banks.ARTICLES
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MARKING-TO MARKET 
AND THE PROPAGATION OF LIQUIDITY CRISES
The illusion of “disposable risk” and the common 
belief that those who hold risks are better prepared 
to absorb and manage them properly have been 
challenged in the recent turbulence. This is especially 
true for money market funds that have invested in 
complex, long-term products, on the basis of their 
rating exclusively.
In the long chain of securitisation, some presumed 
risk absorbers proved in fact to be a source of distress 
contagion between markets. A key reason for this is 
that structurally, ﬁ  nancial institutions have become 
more sensitive to ﬂ  uctuations of market prices with 
the decline in traditional intermediation.
SIVs in particular, must mark their portfolio to 
market on a frequent basis to gauge their net asset 
value. The problem is that the balance sheet of 
SIVs is characterised by a duration and liquidity 
mismatch, with rather illiquid positions on the asset 
side and short-term securities on the liabilities side, 
granting investors the right to exit their investment 
easily.11 When SIVs found themselves unable to roll 
over their short-term liabilities, they were forced 
to liquidate their assets at a large discount and to 
record, on a mark-to-market basis, signiﬁ  cant losses 
in their balance sheets. This was one of the vectors 
of contagion of the liquidity crisis this summer.
More generally, the reactions of institutions to price 
changes and measured risks generate procyclical 
adjustments in their balance sheets and hence in 
markets, which tends to propagate ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties 
and lead to a liquidity squeeze.12 Similarly, sellers 
of protection (for example insurers) might strain 
liquidity through hedging operations on security 
markets when they mark their exposures to market 
on a daily-basis.
As a result of this situation, traditional liquidity 
providers may have difﬁ  culty in intervening in times 
of stress, since they themselves need to draw liquidity 
from the markets when it is scarce.
11  That is to say that SIVs act in a similar way to banks, but without bearing the same constraints and without beneﬁ  ting from the same stability of resources on the 
liabilities side.
12  See Adrian and Shin (2008), in this issue, on the links between mark-to-market practices and leverage.
13  In the case of loans sold with recourse, the buyer has the option to sell the loan back to the bank at a pre-arranged price if the borrower’s quality deteriorates, which 
generates risk for the selling bank.
The deep changes in banks’ balance sheets (and off-balance positions) over the last twenty years may 
have affected the “qualitative asset transformation” services they offer to investors, since they are less 
willing to warehouse and manage the risks themselves. As mentioned previously, there cannot be liquidity 
creation without an agent accepting to bear and manage the risks incorporated in the initial, illiquid assets. 
By becoming liquidity demanders through the transfer of their risks to other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, banks 
may have obscured their own responsibilities in insuring liquidity in “second-to-last resort”, which requires a 
close monitoring of their risks. For example some banks, in the recent ﬁ  nancial turbulence, failed to assume 
their implicit responsibilities as reﬁ  nancers for their conduits (IKB, SachsenLB).
In fact, part of the credit risk transferred to the market by the banking system remains liable to re-emerge 
suddenly and unexpectedly on bank’s books via loan commitments, or loans sold with recourse for instance,13 
even when no legal ties between banks and securitisation entities exist but reputational concerns are at 
stake. This forced re-intermediation is the very evidence that the production of liquidity does not depart 
from banks without risks. In the subprime crisis, regulated institutions have been, rather surprisingly, more 
affected than the others, at the periphery of the system (hedge funds, private equity funds, etc.), precisely 
because banks had poorly assessed their liquidity needs stemming from their sponsoring activity and their 
off-balance sheet vehicles.
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14  See Gatev and Strahan (2004).
15  On this point, see Wagner (2007).
16  See Bervas (2006).
17  It may be noted that such simple devices as lock-up periods in the hedge fund industry can assist in curbing the pathological rise of liquidity preference that may, 
at times, sweep through the ﬁ  nancial system. This has actually been material in the recent turmoil.
Still, commercial banks have a special capacity and interest in offering options to such conduits that other 
institutions do not have to the same extent. In the crisis, banks with a large base of stable deposits have 
proved more resilient than investment banks. Actually, it can be argued that banks have an advantage in 
hedging liquidity risk.14 This seems consistent with the notion developed in Section 1, that there is a natural 
complementarity in traditional monetary intermediation between loan commitments (drawn down during the 
crisis) and deposits (ﬂ  owing into the most credible banks in the crisis). Indeed, Gatev and Strahan (2004) 
found that banks were at the centre of liquidity inﬂ  ows during the 1998 crisis, which enabled them to provide 
liquidity to stressed ﬁ  rms.
At least for reputation reasons, it appears that banks have interest in avoiding the failure of conduits. In 
addition, bank sponsors are themselves direct investors in the capital notes. Therefore it may also be in 
their economic interest to maintain funding and avoid failures that could lead to the collapse of the capital 
notes market. They can do so by acting as marker makers (through the purchase of commercial paper 
and capital notes from the conduits, or by buying assets from them at par rather than market value) or by 
granting credit lines to them. It also behoves the structurers to make up for the lack of secondary markets 
for some tailor-made products that remain de facto very dependent on their issuers.
Admittedly, banks are unlikely to take all credits back onto their balance sheets. There is certainly no 
question of an indiscriminate scaling back of securitisation. But the relative illiquidity of bank assets, duly 
recognised and managed, may also have beneﬁ  cial effects, as it creates an incentive for banks to limit 
their exposure to avoid forced selling (and its costs) in a liquidity crisis.15
The ability of risk absorbers to ascribe an adequate value to complex products turns out to be key in the 
control of liquidity risk.16 In particular, it is necessary for banks selling complex bespoke products to price 
them taking into account their own ability to trade and hedge such an exposure. Otherwise, they might sell 
products beyond their capacity to properly hedge them when markets become tight.
The “liquidity frontier” cannot be pushed back indeﬁ  nitely. Those who, in the end, accept illiquidity in their 
balance-sheet must clearly understand and control the risks they are taking on. Such illiquidity is more 
acceptable for investors with long time horizons, and who are not subject to creditors suddenly calling their 
money at short notice.17 For the others, larger liquidity buffers acting as an automatic stabiliser to smooth 
the ﬁ  nancial cycle might be necessary to hedge their risks.
Without such precautions, ﬁ  nancial innovation could unduly extend the liquidity insurance implicitly expected 
of central banks. Yet, it is certainly not the role of a central bank to prompt market participants to rush into 
“not-so-reliable liabilities”.ARTICLES
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